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The Russian Sphinx: Contemplating Danilevsky’s Enigmatic
Magnum Opus Russia and Europe
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“… This book is based on the idea of the originality lying in the soul of the
Slavic world. The book embraces this issue so deeply and fully that it could
be called a catechism or codex of Slavophilism.”
- Nikolay N. Strakhov.
“Up to a point, he was successful, after his own fashion, in modernizing
Slavophilism without a bizarre confusion of Christian charity and gunfire.”
- Robert E. MacMaster.
Abstract
The relations between Russia and the West have never been particularly easygoing or
unambiguous, and, presently, they are yet again at an all-time low. The way to better
understand, as well as to successfully communicate and cooperate with another society
is through learning about evolution (and revolutions) of their (as well as one’s own)
history and culture. Are there any important sources in the Russian cultural heritage
that could illuminate these ages-old problems, tendencies, and trends? The year 2021
marks 150 years since publication of Nikolay Danilevsky's book Russia and Europe
(1871), while the next one, the year 2022, denotes 200 years from the date of birth of
Danilevsky (1822-1885) himself. The paper highlights multiple sociocultural,
sociohistoric, geopolitical, and historiosophic layers of the Danilevsky’s enigmatic
civilizational legacy. Based on that analysis, it suggests ways for improving relations
between the West and Russia.
Keywords: Danilevsky, Russia and Europe, cultural-historic type, local civilization,
Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, Pochvennichestvo, Fourierism
1

Creating Russia and Europe

During the years 1863-1867 the prominent Russian biologist, historian, mathematician,
and philosopher Nikolai Danilevsky led yet another groundbreaking scientific
expedition, this time surveying the geography and the wildlife of the Black Sea, as well
as its tributaries. From the latter part of 1863 until late in 1867, he conducted a series
of six grueling surveys; around the Sea of Azov, to the river Dnieper, to the river
Manych, around the Black Sea, to the river Kuban, and to the river Danube.
(MacMaster, 1967: 101). Danilevsky’s biographer and translator Stephen M.
Woodburn explains:
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In the following year, 1863, Nikolai Iakovlevich … was assigned as “head of an
expedition for the investigation into the fisheries of the Black and Azov Seas.” This
expedition lasted five years. In September 1863 Nikolai Iakovlevich took his family
down the Volga to Tsarina,1 then crossed the Don by rail and went down to the
Black Sea. He tried to arrange a permanent residence for his family, first in
Feodosia, then in Nikita, but finally settled in Miskhor on the South Coast [of the
Crimea] on 9 March 1864. From Miskhor he made six journeys in the following
order: in 1864, around the Azov Sea; in 1865, on the Dnieper; in spring 1866; on
the Manych [River, tributary of the Don]; in 1867, from 19 May to 19 June, around
the Black Sea; from 10 September to 17 October of the same year, to Kuban, and
from 23 November to 26 December on the Danube. (Woodburn, 2013: XXXI).
In the year 1866, for an outstanding performance in conducting biological, geological,
geographical, climatological, and ethnological research, the scientist and explorer won
the highest award of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society ⸺ the coveted
Constantine Medal. (MacMaster, 1967: 101). During the same years, filled with intense
scientific research, field, and administrative work, between 1865 and 1868, Danilevsky
wrote his historic, politological, and philosophical treatise Russia and Europe.
What is this book? Why, after its appearance exactly one hundred and fifty years ago,
do scholars and thinkers, as well as geopolitical “movers and shakers” continue to argue
about its meaning? Perhaps, one of the reasons is that it is not one book, but rather
several books in one. Like the iconic Russian wooden “matryoshka doll,” the volume
contains multiple layers of historiosophy, geopolitics, culture, and even arts, as well as
a whole lot of theorizing about the evolution of societies and, of course, about human
nature. Let us take a brief look at the historic and cultural movements contextualizing,
as well as a number of seminal ideas underlying this perplexing work.
2

Russia and Europe as a “Catechism or Codex of Slavophilism”

Danilevsky’s complex book reflects in itself multiple historic as well as contemporary
sociocultural, socioeconomic, and historiosophic ideas, movements, and trends.
Among some of the most influential are Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, Pochvennichestvo,
and Fourierism.
2.1

Pan-Slavism

Pan-Slavism was an ideology and a movement among the Slavic peoples in the 18th and
the 19th centuries.
1

Tsaritsyn (1589–1925), then Stalingrad (1925–1961), and presently Volgograd - a city on the western
bank of the Volga river. (Author’s note).
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It originated and was most widely spread in the Balkans, where the non-Slavic powers,
such as the Byzantine Empire, the Republic of Venice, the Austro-Hungarian Empire,
and the Ottoman Empire had ruled the South Slavs for centuries. Recognizing a
common ethnic, historic, cultural, and linguistic background among the Slav peoples,
Pan-Slavism was based on the idea of some form of Slavic integration and/or unification
for the achievement of the common cultural and political goals. The American
philosopher and historian Hans Kohn summarizes:
Pan-Slavism, a movement in which nationalist elements were mingled with supranational and often imperialist trends, was a product of the political awakening of
the intellectuals in central and eastern Europe, which was brought about by the
French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars. But even more potent was the
influence of German romanticism and of a linguistic Pan-Germanism as represented
by Arndt and Fichte. Pan-Slavism proclaimed the affinity of various peoples, in
spite of differences of political citizenship and historical background, of civilization
and religion, solely on the strength of an affinity of language. It could thus arise
only at a time when under the influence of Johann Gottfried Herder the national
language, the mother tongue, was regarded as a determining factor for man’s loyalty
⸺ and his intellectual and spiritual life. … In 1826, the word Pan-Slavism was first
used. Like similar words ⸺ nationalism, socialism, etc. ⸺ it owed its origin and
its spread to the early 19th century. (Kohn, 1960: IX; 325).
2.2

Slavophilism

Another source for Danilevsky’s concepts has been the movement known as
Slavophilism. In the mid-19th century, Russia is beginning to absorb the ideas and
culture of Western Europe at an accelerated pace, and that inexorably creates an
unstable sociocultural and socioeconomic climate. There is a tremendous growth in
revolutionary activity accompanying a general restructuring of tsardom where liberal
reforms, enacted by an unwieldy autocracy, induces a sense of tension in both politics
and civil society.
Slavophiles vigorously oppose the dissemination of Western institutions in Russia, and,
instead, envision its development upon the values derived from its early history. Some
of the founders of the Slavophiles movement are littérateur Ivan S. Aksakov (1823–
1886), his brother, critic and writer Konstantin S. Aksakov (1817– 1860), religious poet
Aleksey S. Khomyakov (1804–1860), literary critic and philosopher Ivan V.
Kireyevsky (1806–1856), historian and journalist Mikhail P. Pogodin (1800–1875), one
of the architects of the Emancipation reform of 1861 Yuri Samarin (1819–1876), great
Romantic poet Fyodor I. Tyutchev (1803–1873), and poet Nikolay M. Yazykov (1803–
1846).
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Besides Danilevsky, among the most prominent Russian thinkers influenced by
Slavophiles ideology are author and philosopher Konstantin N. Leontyev (1831–1891),
writer and philosopher Fyodor M. Dostoyevsky (1821–1881), writer and philosopher
Leo N. Tolstoy, religious and political philosopher Ivan A. Ilyin (1883-1954), as well
as the 20th century novelist and historian Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn (1918–2008).
There is quite a difference of opinions among social thinkers about the roots of
Slavophilism itself. Some Western scholars suggest them to be German classical
philosophy (Schelling, Hegel) and the German idealism (Friedrich von Schelling). The
American political science scholar Thornton Anderson notes:
Often presented as an indigenous pattern of thought peculiar to Russia,
Slavophilism becomes more readily understandable if viewed instead as a part of
the great philosophical reaction against the devastating rationalism of Hume,
Voltaire, and the French Revolution. Its elements ⸺ its admiration for ideals (even
when plainly contradicted by realities), its opposition to materialism and its
tendency toward mysticism, its emphasis upon religion and its attempt to submerge
reason in it ⸺ in short, its inconsistencies and irrationalities, then are more
understandable. The most fruitful segment of that reaction, German idealism,
attained in Friedrich von Schelling a form of religious mysticism adaptable to
Russian Orthodoxy, and beginning with the professors of science in the universities,
his system gradually captivated many Russians. It thus formed the principal
connecting link by which the conservative thought of the West spread to Russia and
reinforced opposition there to the importation of innovations from the West.
(Anderson, 1967: 213).
Yet, the Slavophiles themselves defended the idea of the originality of Slavophilism,
describing it as having been built on the premises of the Byzantine sociohistoric and
religious heritage, as well as Russian Orthodox theology. In some ways, a classic of
civilizational thought, the British historian Arnold J. Toynbee reconciles those
contradictory views. He notes that in any society that needs to confront a more powerful
adversarial civilization, two movements may arise: Herodianism ⸺ calling for the
introduction of new ideas, as well as copying the advanced foreign institutions, and
Zealotism ⸺ advocating isolation in order to preserve the traditional way of life.
(Toynbee, 1957: 231-238)
2.3

Pochvennichestvo

Pochvennichestvo2 was a late 19th-century movement in Russia that, while sharing a
number of features with Slavophilism, represents a more conservative and assertive
version of it.
2

Pochvennichestvo: from Russian “почва” - “soil.” (Author’s note).
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The prominent representatives of this school of thought were the writer and philosopher
of history Konstantin Leontyev, philosopher, publicist and literary critic Nikolay N.
Strakhov (1828-1896), as well as Danilevsky himself.
While supporting the emancipation of serfs, both the Slavophiles and the Pochvenniks
rejected the universalism of the Enlightenment and the liberal and the Marxist ideas, as
well as opposed Europeanization in general. At the same time, Pochvenniks adopted a
more assertive anti-Protestant, anti-Catholic, and generally anti-Western stance, as well
as embraced Pan-Slavism.
As is evident from Danilevsky’s and Leontyev’s legacy, they also developed and
advocated the view of history as evolution of the unique “local” civilizations (culturalhistoric types) while extolling the “true and eternal” virtues and values of the steeped
in the Byzantine sociocultural, sociopolitical, and religious tradition Pan-Slavic
“civilization.”
2.4

Fourierism

In the 1840s, the utopian-socialist ideas of the French thinker Charles Fourier are
becoming very popular among the younger representatives of Russian intelligentsia.3
Danilevsky eagerly studied and has been greatly influenced by them. For example, the
features of the Fourier’s phalanx 4 may be discerned in Danilevsky’s idealized
depiction of the Russian rural obshchina.5
The American historian Frank Fadner notes that “the principle of nationality which
supported the ideological structure of pan-Slavist thought … most completely
synthesized in the work of N. Ya. Danilevskii. …” (Fadner, 1962: 1). The Danilevsky’s
biographer and translator Stephen M. Woodburn agrees, noting that “… classical
Slavophilism lacked ambition and goals, its adherents having a narrowly Russian focus,
rooted in the past. Danilevskii crystallized the identity politics of the Slavophile
movement, but gave it a broader future orientation outside Russia’s borders.
(Woodburn, 2013: XII-XIII). The Russian philosopher, publicist and literary critic
Nikolay N. Strakhov recapitulates: “It is certainly logical to attribute Russia and Europe
to what is called the Slavophile school of our literature, since this book is based on the
idea of the originality lying in the soul of the Slavic world. The book embraces this
issue so deeply and fully that it could be called a catechism or codex of Slavophilism.”
(Strakhov, 2013: XXXVIII).

François Marie Charles Fourier (1772 – 1837) - a French philosopher and one of the founders of
utopian socialism. (Author’s note).
4
Phalanx - a utopian socialist commune. (Author’s note).
5
Obshchina (Russian for "commune”) peasant village communities in Imperial Russia in the 19th and
20th century. (Author’s note).
3
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Thus, there is a definite consensus among prominent social scholars and thinkers, that
Danilevsky has skillfully conflated, laboriously substantiated (correctly or not), and
impressively aggrandized the main ideas of Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, and of related
schools of thought, as well as “weaponized” them, thus creating a Bismarckian-type
theory of a hard-nosed Pan-Slavic “realpolitik.” Let us now look deeper into
Danilevsky’s thought process.
3

Russia and Europe as an attempt at great historiosophy
3.1 Cultural-historical types as local civilizations

Encyclopedia Britannica authoritatively informs us that Danilevsky “was the first to
propound the philosophy of history as a series of distinct civilizations.” (Danilevsky,
2021). The thinker publishes his classic book, initially as a series of articles, in a
monthly literary and political journal Zarya6 during the year of 1869.
Danilevsky is unhappy with canons of the contemporary to him, religion-based historic
studies which claim a linear, teleological evolution of world history, as well as a rigid
division of it into “ancient,” “medieval,” and “modern” periods. As a natural scientist,
Danilevsky is searching for a rational as opposed to a superficial method of study of the
sociocultural world. In other words, he strives to offer a Copernican-type rather than a
Ptolemaic-type system of social sciences, and he calls it a “natural” versus an “artificial”
approach. (Danilevsky, 2013: 58-75).
The scholar identifies four categories of the sociohistoric activity in various societies:
religious, cultural, political, and socioeconomic (Danilevsky, 2013: 405). In this
thinker’s view, those have given rise to ten cultural-historical types: Egyptian; Chinese;
Assyrian-Babylonian-Phoenician; Chaldean or ancient Semite; Indian; Iranian; Jewish;
Greek; Roman; neo-semitic or Arab; Germanic-Roman or European. (Danilevsky,
2013: 73). According to the scholar, those and other advanced societies develop
according to certain “laws of historical development”:
“Law 1. Any tribe of family of peoples characterized by a separate language or group
of languages with similarities that can be readily detected without deep philological
investigation constitutes a distinct cultural-historical type, it has already grown out of
its infancy and is inclined toward and generally capable of historical development.
Law 2. For the civilization of a distinct cultural–historical type to be born and develop,
the peoples belonging to it must have political independence.
Law 3. The principles of civilization for one cultural-historical type are not transferrable
to the peoples of another type. Each type produces its own, influenced more or less by
foreign civilizations preceding or contemporary to it.
“Zarya” (In Russian: “dawn”) was published in Saint Petersburg, Russia in 1869-1872. (Author’s
note).
6

Comparative Civilizations Review

79

Law 4. The civilization of each cultural-historical type only attains fullness, diversity,
and richness when its diverse ethnographic elements, independent but not combined
into a political whole, form a federation or political system of states.7
Law 5. The course of development for cultural-historical types closely resembles that
of perennial plants that bear fruit only once, whose period of growth is indefinitely long,
but whose period of flowering and bearing fruit is relatively short and exhausts its
vitality once and for all.” (Danilevsky, 2013:76)
As it is clearly evident, Danilevsky consistently turns to bio-organismic metaphors in
his analysis of his cultural-historical types, which, in his mind, originate and develop
similar to living organisms. Each type proceeds through the predetermined stages of
youth, adulthood, old age, and demise. And, just like live organisms, Danilevsky’s
cultural-historic types are in a continuous competition with each other, as well as with
the external environment. Thus, the course of history represents a process of
displacement of one cultural-historical type by another. Stephen M. Woodburn
comments on Danilevsky’s natural science-influenced analytical approach:
Here his scientific career informed his politics. It is crucial to remember that
Danilevskii the nationalist was first and foremost a naturalist (or what we now call
a biologist), concerned with the proper classification of specimens by their inherent
similarities or differences. His vocation provides the essential metaphor and the
scientific-positivist outlook shaping his book. …As a naturalist he was concerned
with proper classification, grouping like organisms together on the basis of
similarities. (Woodburn, 2013: XII).
As to Europe and the Slavs, Danilevsky believes that they represent fundamentally
different sociohistoric types. The scholar perceives the Slavic sociocultural type as an
entity in its youthful prime and conceives a geopolitical agenda for its future. The plan
involves integration of the Slavic peoples into a Pan-Slavic Union with its capital in
Constantinople. In relation to the New World, Danilevsky puts forward a similar idea
of a forthcoming new and uniquely American cultural-historical type. (Danilevsky,
2013: 192; 368). Stephen M. Woodburn reviews for us Danilevsky’s thought process:
The book can be divided into three sections. The first, chapters 1-7, develops his
theory of the biology of nations to explain the disconnect between Russia and
Europe, and compares his theory to other sciences ⸺ which progress from data
collection to an “artificial system” or flawed paradigm that requires a “natural
system” or improved paradigm to resolve its flaws ⸺ to justify his theory of
cultural-historic types as a “natural system” of this kind for the study of human
history.
A correct translation from Russian would be “independent and not combined into a political whole,
form a federation or political system of states.” See: p. 116 in Danilevsky, N. I. (2008). Russia and
Europe. (In Russian). Moscow: Terra. (Authors’ note).
7
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The second section, chapters 8-11, delves deeper into history to explain a series of
differences or distinctions (razlichiia) between the Germanic-Roman and the Slavic
types: the difference in mental framework, the confessional or religious difference,
and the difference in the course of historical upbringing. It concludes in an
examination of Russian history diagnosing “Europeanism” (evropeinichan’e) as the
sickness or syndrome afflicting Russia in its development forcing its growth into an
unnatural course. The last section, chapters 12-17, concerns the Eastern Question
(the host of issues surrounding the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the fate of its
territories and waterways), in which Danilevskii saw a coming shock that would jolt
the Russian national spirit to awaken from its slumber, shake off this disease, and
fulfill its historical destiny: to create a political federation of Slavic states with
Russia at the head, bringing the Slavic cultural-historical type to fruition. The
second and third sections account for Danilevskii’s association with the Slavophiles
and the movement known as Pan-Slavism, although this requires some context.
While he did quote Slavophiles in the text and epigrams throughout the work, and
while his friend Strakhov called the book a “catechism or codex of Slavophilism,”
Danilevskii pressed the romantic nationalism of the Slavophiles into the pragmatic
mold of Bismarckian Realpolitik. (Woodburn, 2013: XXIV).
3.2 Criticism of Danilevsky’s theory

Danilevsky is a true pioneer of the macro-level and long-term sociocultural studies. In
his classic book, he laid the foundations of a number of scholarly areas of expertise.
Practically all the scholars of global studies owe a debt of gratitude to him. The scholar
brilliantly succeeds in criticizing the linear notion of the progression of world history
and especially of the contemporary (to him) artificial division of it into the consequently
arranged “ancient,” “medieval,” and “modern” periods. He correctly asserts that every
society may have its own stages of sociohistoric evolution. However, he also made
mistakes since some of the most fundamental laws of the structure and evolution of the
sociocultural universe have been discovered only after his untimely demise during his
last scientific expedition in 1885. (Sorokin, 1956, 1963, 1966, 1991).
For example, when it comes to the elaboration of the evolution of “life-careers” of the
“cultural-historic types,” his highly metaphoric bio-organismic concept understandably
falters. Being a naturalist, Danilevsky “appropriates” his notions and concepts from the
familiar, contemporary to him “toolbox” of natural sciences. He did not, and could not
take in to consideration yet undiscovered properties, characteristics, and regularities,
specific only to the sociocultural universe. As a result, his highly metaphoric schema
of the structure and the evolution of the “cultural-historic entities” remained, in his own
words, “artificial.” Pitirim A. Sorokin addresses the structure of Danilevsky (and his
followers) “artificial” paradigm of the sociocultural universe as follows:
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The first fatal shortcoming of Danilevsky’s, Spengler’s, and Toynbee’s conceptions
(on this point) consists of their acceptance of their “cultural-historical type,” High
Culture, or “civilization” as a real unity, in the sense of either a causal or a causalmeaningful system.
Like the so-called “functional anthropologists” and
“totalitarian integrators,” they assume that the total culture of each of their
“prototypes,” High Cultures, and “civilizations” is completely integrated and
represents one meaningfully consistent and causally unified whole, thus making a
sort of cultural supersystem that embraces in itself all the cultural phenomena of the
Egyptian, Chinese. Appollinian, Magian, Faustian, or any other culture-civilization
they mention. (Sorokin, 1963: 209).
Grounding his analysis in the fundamental theory of social and cultural dynamics 8
Sorokin further explains that “the Danilevsky-Spengler-Toynbee type, High Culture, or
civilization is neither a causal, nor a meaningful, nor a causal - meaningful system, but
rather a cultural field where a multitude of vast and small cultural systems and
congeries ⸺ partly mutually harmonious, partly neutral, partly contradictory ⸺ coexist. A part of the systems are meaningfully and causally connected to make vaster
systems; a part are connected through causal ties only; a part only through indirect
causal ties; and a large part are nothing more than spatially adjacent congeries. The
totality of all these systems and congeries does not make any unified cultural system,
whether Egyptian, Babylonian, Magian, or Mayan “civilization” or “culture-historical
type.” … Thus all three scholars make the basic error of taking for a civilizationalcultural system something that is no unity at all. They crown this error by the further
one of mixing up the cultural and social systems (organized groups), and they display
an additional inconsistency even in this operation. After all, the Danilevsky-SpenglerToynbee classifications are not so much classifications of civilizational or cultural
systems as they are of social systems (organized groups).” (Sorokin, 1963: 213-214;
216).
As to the essential characteristics of theories which belong to the bio-organizmic
paradigm, Sorokin briefly summarizes them as follows:
First, the society or social group is a special kind of an organism in a biological
sense of the word. Second, being an organism, society resembles, in its essential
characteristics, the constitution and the functions of a biological organism. Third,
as an organism, society is subject to the same biological laws as those by which a
biological organism functions and lives. Fourth, sociology is a science which is to
be based primarily upon biology. (Sorokin, 1956: 201-202).

8

See Sorokin, P. (1937–1941). Social and Cultural Dynamics. Cincinnati: American Book Company. 4
vols. (Author’s note).
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The “life-careers” of groups and societies obviously differ from those of plants or living
organisms. Sorokin notes referring to the fallacy of the organismic univariant lifecourse of their “civilizations”:
The second mistake of Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee (in his earlier volumes)
is their contention that the life-course of all civilizations runs one univariant
“organic” cycle: They are all born, then grow, and eventually disintegrate and die.
This unduly generalized model of the life-course of civilizations can, at best, be
applied to some of the organized social groups as the central agency of each of their
“civilizations.” … But in no way can the univariant model of birth, maturity, and
death be applied to any of the “civilizations.” Since the total culture of each of these
“civilizations” has never been integrated into one consistent system, it evidently
cannot disintegrate. (Sorokin, 1966, 219-220).
Thus, as an attempt at grand historiosophy, Danilevsky’s work fails to meet the rigorous
criteria of contemporary scientific social research. The historiosophic schema,
scrupulously elaborated by Danilevsky, is ultimately incorrect, although impressive.
While striving to discover a rational, “natural” theory, he was able to offer only a highly
metaphoric, “artificial” theory of humanity’s historic evolution. As all metaphorical
schemas, it can only “work” within certain limits and to a certain extent.
3.3 New concepts
As we have already observed, Danilevsky's book prefigured a number of theories in
Oswald Spengler's The Decline of the West, Arnold Toynbee’s A Study of History,
Carroll Quigley’s The Evolution of Civilizations, and multiple other important
sociohistoric sources, essentially establishing the field of the comparative theory of
civilizations. For example, continuing in the framework of Danilevsky’s paradigm,
Toynbee had proposed five main stages of the civilizations-societies evolution: Genesis,
Growth, Time of Troubles, Universal State, and Disintegration. Quigley has expanded
their number to seven: Mixture, Gestation, Expansion, Age of Conflict, Universal
Empire, Decay, and Invasion. However, the model remained not only cyclical, which
for the developed societies is essentially correct (they are all finite), but unnecessarily
rigid.
Yet, there are ways to solve this problem. Using the results of contemporary
fundamental social research, we have developed a “universal” model of the
sociohistoric evolution of societies. In it, we not only increased the number of stages
to nine, but also introduced a virtually unlimited amount of possible variations. It
includes such stages as: Emergence of Groups; Formation of Societies; Mixture;
Gestation; Expansion; Conflict/Time of Troubles; Universal State/Empire; Decay, and
Invasion / Implosion / Force Majeure stages.

Comparative Civilizations Review

83

A society (or a “civilization,” perceived as society) proceeds either through all or
through a certain unique combination of those nine main stages.
It also incorporates Toynbee’s Hellenic, Chinese, and Jewish models, Toynbee’s later
stage “arrest” and “petrifaction” stages, as well as various Toynbee’s patterns of societal
disintegration (“two-and-a-half beat,” “three-and-a-half-beat,” “four-and-a-half
beat,” “five-and-a-half beat”), etc. One of the main characteristics of such a model is
its flexibility. While including all of the stages proposed by Danilevsky, Leontyev,
Spengler, Toynbee, Quigley, and others, it encompasses virtually unlimited variations
of societal evolution. (Alalykin-Izvekov, 2011: 107-114).
4 Legacy
4.1 Danilevsky’s ideas and contemporary political discourse
Despite the flaws which are obvious to a contemporary social scholar, Danilevsky’s
book has become a rather successful “piece of political prognostication and prophecy”
(Sorokin, 1966: 187), thus making a considerable impact on philosophy of history,
political theory, and the field of the comparative theory of civilizations, among others.
In some ways, it also tangibly and rather disastrously influenced the external policies
of the declining Russian Empire in its waning years.9
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism has interrupted the trajectory of Russia’s development
along the path of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, and for most of the 20 century
propelled it down the road of “class struggle” and “world revolution.” Yet, after 70
years of embracing those policies, Russia may be now returning to Danilevsky’s
paradigm of multiple local civilizations (cultural-historic types) as opposed to the
universal, global civilization, and choosing “every civilization for itself” policies and
strategies.
Scholars agree that Danilevsky’s magnum opus has played, is playing, and is likely to
continue playing an important role in Russian intellectual history. For example,
Danilevsky’s ideas may have resumed their influence on contemporary political
discourse. Let us see if we can discern the overtones of Danilevsky’s ideas in the
national and ethnic agenda of the Russian President Vladimir V. Putin:
The Russian experience of state development is unique. Ours is a multiethnic
society; we are a united people. This makes our country complicated and
multidimensional and gives us unique opportunities for development in many
spheres.
9

On the nearsightedness and inefficiency of the WWI era political leaders see, for example, Clark, C.
(2012). The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. NY: Harper. (Author’s note).
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However, when a multiethnic society is infected with the virus of nationalism, it
loses its strength and stability. We must understand the far-reaching consequences
of indulging those who are trying to incite ethnic strife and hatred towards people
of other cultures and faiths. … The Russian people are state-builders, as evidenced
by the existence of Russia. Their great mission is to unite and bind together a
civilisation. … This kind of civilisational identity is based on preserving the
dominance of Russian culture, although this culture is represented not only by ethnic
Russians, but by all the holders of this identity, regardless of their ethnicity. It is a
kind of cultural code, which has been attacked ever more often over the past few
years; hostile forces have been trying to break it, and yet, it has survived. (Putin,
2012).

The echo of Danilevsky’s ideas may be also heard in recent statements of the Russian
foreign envoys. On February 12, 2021, the top Russian diplomat mentioned that Russia
is ready to sever ties with the European Union if the bloc would impose new,
economically painful sanctions. He added: "If you want peace, prepare for war."
(Lavrov, 2021). That same week German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier noted that
“energy ties are almost the last bridge between Russia and Europe.” (BBC News, 2021).
Stephen M. Woodburn correctly recapitulates:
… It is worth persisting with this text because of its important place in Russian
intellectual history of the nineteenth century, and its impact on the thinking of a
growing number of twenty-first-century readers. Danilevskii provides essential
background for Russian Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism, the ideologies best poised
to inform Russian policy over the next decades. This makes a case for calling Russia
and Europe the most important nineteenth-century book for the post-Soviet period,
and thus an object worthy of further study by specialist and non-specialist alike.
(Woodburn, 2013: XXV).
4.2 What’s next?
Let us take a view of the planet as a whole. We see that, presently, the world is in deep
distress. Humanity is dealing with unprecedented challenges, which include
overpopulation, resource depletion, and global warming (Targowski, 2009). Starting
in 2019, the world witnessed the COVID-19 pandemic unleashing its terrific force on
human communities, cities, and societies around the planet.
The pandemic has greatly amplified already existing social, racial, ethnic, and economic
disparities. Spurred by the pandemic, social tensions have ensued. (Alalykin-Izvekov,
2020; 2014). The adequate and extensive sociocultural and socioeconomic reforms are
needed to ensure the continuing viability of humanity as a whole.
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While Russia is “finding her roots,” the West, not excluding its leading nation, the
United States, may be experiencing a “midlife crisis” of its own. In the aftermath of
European Union Migrant Crisis (2014-Present), Hurricane Katrina Calamity (2005),
Black Lives Matter Movement (2013-Present), Coronavirus COVID-19 Pandemic
(2019-Present), Storming of the US Capitol by Insurrectionists (2021), Texas Power
Crisis (2021), European Union Coronavirus COVID-19 Vaccination Debacle (20202021), it may need to take a long and hard look at the civil, political, social, ethnic,
racial, cultural, and human rights issues in its own realm.10
As our analysis demonstrates, Russian and Western elites may be finding ourselves in
rather different mental civilizational paradigms, and therefore, operating in different
civilizational frameworks. While Western elites tend to think and act in the universe of
the Fukuyamian “End of History” paradigm of the liberal “universal” and “global
civilization,” the Russian upper classes are inclined to think and act in the framework
of the Danilevsky-type, “pluralistic” world of multiple “local civilizations” (“culturalhistoric types”). As a result, the present level of the relations between the West and
Russia is dangerously low. The obvious and reasonable foundation for balanced and
mutually beneficial relations between Russia and the West may be something that both
sides can agree on. Such a foundation exists. It is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights together with other related documents, such as the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights.
In his monograph on the origins and the evolution of universal human rights, the
American scholar Jack Donnelly postulates, “human rights have become a central,
perhaps even defining, feature of our social and political reality. The vison of human
dignity they reflect and seek to implement is accepted by almost all states as
authoritative, whatever their deviations from these norms in practice.” (Donnelly, 2003:
61).
The Universal Declaration and other UN documents enshrine the essential rights,
values, and freedoms of all human beings. Created following the horrors of World War
I and World War II, it was accepted by the General Assembly in Paris, France on
December 10, 1948.

10

For history of problems with social, racial, and ethnic inequality in the West see, for example:
Fredrickson, G. (2002). Racism: A Short History. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press;
Haney Lopez, I. (2006). White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race. New York and London: New
York University Press; Montagu, A. (1964). Man’s Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race.
Cleveland and New York. The World Publishing Company; Whitman, J. (2017). Hitler’s American
Model: The United States and the Making of Nazi Race Law. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press; Wilkerson, I. (2020). Caste: The Origins of Our Discontents. New York: Random
House. (Author’s note).
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The Universal Declaration model treats internationally recognized human rights
holistically, as an indivisible structure in which the value of each right is significantly
augmented by the presence of many others. (Donnelly, 2003: 27).
The principal drafters of the Universal Declaration were representatives of many
countries ⸺ Canada, France, USA, USSR, Lebanon, China, and Chile. (Donnelly,
2003: 61). All member states of the United Nations have either signed on in agreement
with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or ratified at least one of the nine
binding treaties influenced by the Declaration, with the vast majority ratifying four or
more. Presently, all involved sides, including Russia and the West, could substantially
benefit from carefully re-reading those fundamental documents, as well as actually
acting on them.
Conclusions
1. Nikolay Ya. Danilevsky is a major representative of 19th century sociocultural,
historiosophic, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic thought. His magnum opus
Russia and Europe contains multiple layers of a thoroughly elaborated
civilizational legacy. Among important sources for Danilevsky’s ideas are
many seminal historic and contemporary theories, including such major schools
of thought as Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, Pochvennichestvo, and Fourierism.
There is a definite consensus among social scholars and thinkers that Danilevsky
has skillfully conflated, laboriously substantiated (correctly or not), and
impressively aggrandized the main ideas of Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, and of
related schools of thought, as well as “weaponized” them, thus creating a
Bismarckian-type theory of a hard-nosed Pan-Slavic “realpolitik.”
2. However, as an attempt at great historiosophy, the work fails to meet the
rigorous criteria of contemporary scientific social research. The scrupulously
elaborated by Danilevsky highly metaphoric historiosophic paradigm is
ultimately incorrect, though impressive. It offers, in his own words, an
“artificial” theory of humanity’s historic evolution. As all metaphorical
constructs, it can only “work” within certain limits and to a certain extent. It is
not the scholar’s fault since many important laws and regularities of the
structure and evolution of the sociocultural universe have been discovered only
after his untimely demise in 1885. Despite flaws which are obvious to a
contemporary social scholar, Danilevsky’s book has become a rather successful
“piece of political prognostication and prophecy,” thus making a considerable
impact on philosophy of history, political theory, and the field of the
comparative theory of civilizations, among others. In many ways, it also
tangibly influenced the external policies of the declining Russian Empire in its
waning years.
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3. Danilevsky's book prefigured a number of theories of other prominent social
scholars, essentially establishing the field of the comparative theory of
civilizations. However, his and his followers’ models remained not only
cyclical, which for the development of societies is essentially correct (they are
all finite), but unnecessarily rigid. Using the results of contemporary
fundamental social research, we have developed a “universal” model of the
sociohistorical evolution of societies. In it, we not only increased the number of
stages but also introduced a virtually unlimited amount of possible variations.
Since one of the main characteristics of our model is flexibility, it encompasses
a virtually unlimited amount of variations of societal evolution.
4. Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism has interrupted the trajectory of Russia’s
development along the path of Slavophilism and Pan-Slavism, and for most of
the 20 century propelled it down the road of “class struggle” and “world
revolution.” Yet, after 70 years of embracing those ideologies and based on
their policies, Russia may be now returning to Danilevsky’s paradigm of
multiple local civilizations (cultural-historic types) as opposed to the universal,
global civilization, and choosing “every civilization for itself” policies and
strategies. Scholars agree that Danilevsky’s magnum opus has played, is
playing, and is likely to continue playing an important role in Russian
intellectual and sociopolitical history. Providing an essential basis for the
Russian Pan-Slavism and Eurasianism, it may influence Russian ideological
paradigms and policies for decades to come.
5. At the same time, the West may be experiencing a “midlife crisis” of its own. In
the aftermath of the European Migrant Crisis (2014-Present), Hurricane
Katrina Calamity (2005), Black Lives Matter Movement (2013-Present),
Coronavirus COVID-19 Pandemic (2019-Present), Storming of the US Capitol
by Insurrectionists (2021), Texas Power Crisis (2021), and European Union
Coronavirus COVID-19 Vaccination Debacle (2020-2021), it may need to take
a long and hard look at the civil, political, social, ethnic, racial, cultural, and
human rights issues in its own realm.
6. As our analysis demonstrates, Russian and Western elites may be finding
ourselves in rather different mental civilizational paradigms, and therefore,
operating in different civilizational frameworks. While Western elites tend to
think and act in the universe of the Fukuyamian “End of History” paradigm of
the liberal “universal” and “global civilization,” the Russian upper classes are
inclined to think and act in the framework of the Danilevsky-type, “pluralistic”
world of the multiple “local civilizations” (“cultural-historic types”). As a
result, the present level of the relations between the West and Russia is
dangerously low.
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The obvious and reasonable foundation for balanced and mutually beneficial
relations between Russia and the West may be something that both sides can
agree on. Such a foundation exists. It is the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights together with other related documents, such as the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights.

References
Alalykin-Izvekov, V. (2020). Pestilence and Other Calamities in Civilizational
Theory: Sorokin, McNeill, Diamond, and Beyond. Comparative Civilizations
Review: Vol. 83: No. 83, Article 13. Available at:
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol83/iss83/13
Alalykin-Izvekov, Vlad and Satkiewicz, Stephen (2014) "From Brinton To Goldstone:
A Scientific Civilizational Perspective On The Theory Of Revolution,"
Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 71: No. 71, Article 8. Available at:
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol71/iss71/8
Alalykin-Izvekov, V. (2011) "Civilizational Science: The Evolution of a New Field,"
Comparative Civilizations Review: Vol. 64: No. 64, Article 10. Available at:
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol64/iss64/10
Anderson, T. (1967). Russian Political Thought: An Introduction. Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press.
BBC News. Russia warns EU it could cut ties over sanctions. February 12, 2021.
Electronic source. Retrieved 02/27/21.
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-56039075
Danilevsky, N. Ya. (2021). Nikolay Yakovlevich Danilevsky. Russian philosopher.
Encyclopaedia Britannica. Electronic resource. Retrieved 02/16/21.
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Nikolay-Yakovlevich-Danilevsky
Danilevsky, N.I. (2013). Russia and Europe. Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica.
Donnelly, J. (2003). Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice. Ithaca and
London: Cornell University Press.
Fadner, F. (1962). Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karazin to Danilevskii.
1800-1870. Georgetown University Press.
Kohn, H. (1960). Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology. New York: Vintage Books.
Lavrov, S. (2021). Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's interview to the YouTube
channel Soloviev Live, February 12, 2021. (In Russian). Electronic source.
Retrieved 02/16/21.
https://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news//asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/4570813
MacMaster, R. (1967). Danilevsky: A Russian Totalitarian Philosopher. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Comparative Civilizations Review

89

Putin, V. (2012). Russia: The National Question. (In Russian Language)
Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Electronic resource. Retrieved 01.07.21
https://www.ng.ru/politics/2012-01-23/1_national.html
Sorokin, P. (1956). Contemporary Sociological Theories: Through the First Quarter
of the Twentieth Century. New York, Evanston and London: Harper & Row,
Publishers.
Sorokin, P. (1963) Modern Historical and Social Philosophies. New York: Dover
Publications.
Sorokin, P. (1966). Sociological Theories of Today. New York and London. Harper &
Row, Publishers.
Sorokin, Pitirim А. (1991). Social and Cultural Dynamics. New Brunswick, New
Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
Strakhov, N. The Life and Works of N. Ia. Danilevskii. In: Danilevskii, N.I. (2013).
Russia and Europe. Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica.
Targowski, A. (2009). Information Technology and Societal Development. Hershey,
PA, New York: Public Affairs.
Toynbee, A. (1957). A Study of History. Abridgement of Volumes VII-X. New York &
London. Oxford University Press.
Woodburn, S. Translator’s Introduction. In: Danilevskii, N.I. (2013). Russia and
Europe. Bloomington, Indiana: Slavica.

